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Abstract
A block cipher based hash-function of Yi and Lam [5] is analysed and shown to be
signicantly weaker than originally intended.
1 Introduction
Yi and Lam [5] give a method for deriving a 2m-bit hash-function from a block cipher
with an m-bit block length and a 2m-bit key length. We show that the hash-function is
somewhat less secure than claimed in [5]; indeed, it appears to oer no signicant gains
over the `single length' block cipher based hash-function in ISO/IEC 10118-2 [1].
2 The Yi-Lam hash-function
The hash-function is based on the iterated use of a round-function, which is, in turn,
block cipher based. Data to be hashed is split into m-bit blocks, with padding added,
as necessary, to the nal block. An extra nal block is added, containing an encoding
of the data's bit-length prior to padding. We denote the resulting string of blocks by:
M
1
;M
2
; : : : ;M
n
, where M
n
contains the encoded length value.
Denote block cipher encryption by E
K
(M), whereM is an m-bit block and K is a 2m-bit
key (we also use D to denote decryption). The hash-function is computed by recursively
computing the following values, for i successively equal to 1; 2; : : : ; n.
H
i
= E
K
i
(M
i
)M
i
;

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Gi
= (E
K
i
(M
i
)G
i 1
)[+]H
i 1
; (1)
where:
 G
0
and H
0
are `specied initial values'
1
,
  denotes bit-wise exclusive-or of blocks,
 [+] and [ ] denote addition and subtraction modulo 2
m
, where m-bit blocks are
treated as binary representations of numbers in the range [0; 2
m
  1],
 K
i
is the 2m-bit key obtained by concatenating G
i 1
and H
i 1
(1  i  n), and
 the 2m-bit hash-code is the concatenation of G
n
and H
n
.
Unfortunately the fact that the triple G
i 1
; G
i
and H
i
can be used to compute M
i
in
(1) means that this hash-function is susceptible to three solving one-half attacks [2]. For
completeness we describe in detail how to implement the general attacks described in [2].
We assume throughout that the block cipher behaves as a random function; if it does not,
then other attacks are likely to be possible.
3 Finding a collision
Suppose an attacker wishes to nd two dierent n-block data strings yielding the same
hash-code. The attacker chooses an arbitrarym-bit value G
n 1
and arbitrary data blocks
M
1
;M
2
; : : : ;M
n 3
. The attacker then computes the pair of values (G
n 3
; H
n 3
). The
attacker now performs the following steps 2
m=2
times.
1. Choose a data block M
n 2
.
2. Compute (G
n 2
; H
n 2
) . Let K
n 1
be the 2m-bit cipher key obtained by concate-
nating (G
n 2
; H
n 2
).
3. Compute M
n 1
= D
K
n 1
((G
n 1
[ ]H
n 2
) G
n 2
).
4. Compute H
n 1
= E
K
n 1
(M
n 1
)M
n 1
.
Each pair of data blocks (M
n 2
;M
n 1
) and the corresponding H
n 1
are stored. At
the end of this process the attacker checks all the m-bit values H
n 1
(there will be
2
m=2
of them) to see if any pair are equal. By the \birthday problem" there is a high
probability that such a pair will exist. If the matching values of H
n 1
correspond to
the message pairs (M
n 2
;M
n 1
) and (M
0
n 2
;M
0
n 1
) then it is simple to verify that the
sequences (M
1
; : : : ;M
n 3
;M
n 2
;M
n 1
) and (M
1
; : : : ;M
n 3
;M
0
n 2
;M
0
n 1
) both hash to
(G
n 1
; H
n 1
). To complete the attack we append the additional block M
n
to each se-
quence, where M
n
is a valid encoding for a message containing (n   1)m bits. We then
have two data strings with the same hash-code.
Each iteration of the above steps involves 3 encryptions and decryptions. Hence the attack
complexity is 3:2
m=2
, substantially less than the brute force value of around 2
m
.
1
Note that it is not clear whether Yi and Lam intend these values to be xed for all applications of the
hash-function, although, since this is generally the most secure option, we assume that they are xed, at
least within a particular domain of use.
2
Note that, to get two messages of (dierent) pre-determined meanings with the same
hash, then we perform two sets of 2
m=2
iterations of the above steps, the rst (second)
set being performed with 2
m=2
variants of the rst (second) message. A match between
the rst and second sets will give the desired `collision'.
4 Finding a second pre-image
Note that this attack was referred to as a \target attack" in [5]. Suppose an attacker has
a data string M
1
;M
2
; : : : ;M
n
and the corresponding hash-code (G
n
; H
n
). We show how
the attacker can nd another data string (of the same length) with the same hash-code.
The attacker rst computes the pair (G
n 1
; H
n 1
), by hashing all but the last block of
the data string. The attacker then chooses data blocks M

1
;M

2
; : : : ;M

n 3
and computes
the pair of values (G

n 3
; H

n 3
). The attacker now performs the following steps as many
times as necessary.
1. Choose a data block M

n 2
.
2. Compute the pair (G

n 2
; H

n 2
). Let K

n 1
be the 2m-bit cipher key obtained by
concatenating (G

n 2
; H

n 2
).
3. Compute M

n 1
= D
K

n 1
((G
n 1
[ ]H

n 2
) G

n 2
).
4. Compute H

n 1
= E
K

n 1
(M

n 1
)M

n 1
.
5. If H
n 1
= H

n 1
then it is simple to verify that (M

1
;M

2
; : : : ;M

n 1
;M
n
) has hash-
code (G
n
; H
n
), i.e. we have a second pre-image for the specied hash-code. It is
important to note that M
n
is the same as the value for the original message, since
this encodes the message length.
The probability of success in each iteration of the above steps is 2
 m
, and hence the
expected number of times they must be performed to nd a (second) pre-image is 2
m 1
.
Each iteration involves 3 encryptions or decryptions, and hence the expected attack com-
plexity is 3:2
m 1
, signicantly less than the 2
2m
required for a brute force attack.
5 Finding a pre-image
Conducting a pre-image attack is only marginally more dicult than a second pre-image
attack. We note that the full details of such an attack were not provided in [2]. In this
case the attacker has a hash-code (G
n
; H
n
), but does not know the corresponding data
string. We show how to nd a data string giving this hash-code.
The attacker starts by choosing a value M
n
, which encodes a valid length for an (n  1)-
block data string (e.g. the value m(n 1)). The attacker now performs the following steps
as many times as necessary.
1. Choose an m-bit block H

n 1
.
2. Find the unique value G

n 1
which satises
H
n
M
n
 G

n 1
= G
n
[ ]H

n 1
:
Let K

n
be the 2m-bit cipher key obtained by concatenating (G

n 1
; H

n 1
).
3
3. Check whether or not E
K

n
(M
n
) = H
n
M
n
. If so, then exit this iterative process
and save (G

n 1
, H

n 1
).
Note that it is not guaranteed that the above steps will succeed in nding a pair (G

n 1
,
H

n 1
), since such a pair will not always exist; however, the probability of success is
greater than 0.5. Moreover, if the attacker happens, by accident or design, to choose the
same value of M
n
as was used to originally generate the hash-code, then the existance of
at least one pair is guaranteed. The attacker now proceeds as for the second pre-image
attack, except with (G
n 1
; H
n 1
) replaced by (G

n 1
; H

n 1
).
The success probability for both the search for (G

n 1
; H

n 1
) and the pre-image search
is 2
 m
, and so the expected number of times they must be performed is 2
m 1
. Each
iteration of the rst and second sets of steps respectively involves 1 and 3 encryptions or
decryptions. The expected attack complexity is thus 2
m+1
, again signicantly less than
the complexity of a brute force attack.
6 Conclusions
It has been shown that contrary to claims in [5] the hash-function of Yi and Lam is not
signicantly more secure than an m-bit hash function of the type described in ISO/IEC
10118-2 [1]. This is due to fatal design aw that leaves the hash-function susceptible to
the \solving one-half attacks" described in [2]. For recent work on how best to design a
hash-function using a block cipher see [3, 4].
The authors would like to thank Bart Preneel and Vincent Rijmen for useful discussions.
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